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I. INTRODUCTION
The presentation of prosecution cases before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal) will
require argument on a wide range of international law issues. It will
not be possible, and it would not be desirable, simply to dust off the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Judgments, the United Nations War Crimes
Commission series of Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,and the
U.S. government's Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.10 and presume
that one has a readily available source of answers for all legal
problems. An invaluable foundation for legal argument before the
Tribunal is provided by Pictet's Commentaries on the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC)
Commentaries on the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the few cases decided since 1950, old case law,
and various learned articles and treatises. They must be reviewed and
analyzed. At the same time, however, just as the prosecutors in the
post-1945 war crimes trials argued successfully that customary law had
evolved after 1907 and 1929, so it is reasonable to presume that
customary law has evolved since the Geneva Convention of 1949 and
the Additional Protocols of 1977.
It is essential to pay due heed to the principles of nullum crimen
sine lege and nulla poena sine lege.1 One must, however, distinguish

* Senior Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. These comments are made in a personal capacity and do not necessarily
reflect the views of either the office of the Prosecutor or the United Nations.
1. These terms loosely translate to "no crime without a statute" and "no punishment
without a statute," respectively.
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between the existence of a substantive crime and the existence of
jurisdiction to punish the crime. The ICRC made the following
remarks while the statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia ("Tribunal Statute") was being drafted:
International Humanitarian Law as embodied in the four Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol I does contain an obligation
incumbent upon the parties to a conflict as well as other contracting
parties to repress grave breaches of this law, which are thus
submitted to universal jurisdiction. However, it does not provide
for any international jurisdiction, although, at the same time, in no
way does it prohibit such jurisdiction. Consequently, the competence to create an international tribunal cannot be based upon
existing International Humanitarian Law itself but, in the present
case, upon Resolution 808.2
Article 1 of the Tribunal Statute sets out the competence of the
Tribunal as follows:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 3since
1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.
As a starting point for analysis of the Tribunal Statute, one must bear
in mind that the legal basis for the Tribunal is a Security Council
resolution, that the Tribunal exercises jurisdiction on the basis of
internationality and not universality, and that the Tribunal has the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
humanitarian law.
II. ARTICLE 3 OF THE TRIBUNAL STATUTE
A. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
Early indictments issued by the Tribunal prosecution, now
publicly available, generally allege three types of charges against an
2. Some preliminary remarks by the ICRC on the setting up of an International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (UNSCR 808 (1993) adopted on 22
February 1993) ICRC Doc. 25-03-93 DDMIJUR/422B.
3. Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph2 of Security CouncilResolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Tribunal Statute].
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accused. The indictment of Dugan Tadic, for example, alleges in part
that:
Dugan TADIC participated in the willful killing. of Emir
KARABAkIC, a GRAVE BREACH recognised by Articles 2(a)
and 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal, or;
Alternatively, Dugan TADIC participated in the murder of Emir
KARABSIC, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF
WAR recognised by Articles 3 and 7(1) of the Statute of the
Tribunal and Article 3(1) (a) of the Geneva Conventions.
Dugan TADIC participated in the murder of Emir KARABAkIC,

a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY recognised by Articles 5(a) and
7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

As this indictment evidences, the prosecution has adopted the
approach that Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute confers power to
prosecute persons violating common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions
This approach reflects the fact that, in certain
circumstances, the law applicable to international armed conflicts may
not apply to a particular case. In such a case, assuming the existence
of a non-international armed conflict is established, common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions is to be applied.
The application of common Article 3 to the Balkan situations has
not been universally endorsed. It has been suggested that the
Tribunal has no power to punish violations of common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions under Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute for
several reasons. First, common Article 3 does not entail individual
criminal liability.5 Second, Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute refers
exclusively to international armed conflicts.6 Third, Article 4 of the
Rwanda Statute refers specifically to violations of common Article 3
and, therefore, by negative implication, the Tribunal does not have

4. Both common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and Article 3 of the Tribunal
Statute refer to violations of the laws or customs of war. See, e.g., Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 288; Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 3.
5. Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 EJ.I.L. 360, 366 (1994).
6. P. Rowe, War Crimes and the Former Yugoslavia; the Legal Difficulties, 32 MIL L. &
L. OF WAR REV. 317, 331-33 (1993); Frits Kalshoven, unpublished paper prepared for
Symposium on The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, The Hague, February
16, 1995.
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such power.
These arguments however, are without merit. The fundamental
mandate of the Tribunal is to prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia. Violations of common Article 3
constitute such serious violations. Indeed, when the Tribunal Statute
was approved, the United States indicated its view that breaches of
common Article 3 could be prosecuted under Article 3 of the Tribunal
Statute.! Although at one time the concept of violations of the laws
or customs of war was applicable exclusively to international armed
conflicts, that time has passed. Most conflicts today are internal
armed conflicts, and a customary law, tailored for internal armed
conflicts, has emerged. This body of customary law is not identical to
the customary law for international armed conflicts. It includes,
however, a concept of violations of the laws and customs of war and,
at a minimum, breaches of the obligations contained in common
Article 3 constitute violations of the laws and customs of war for
internal conflicts. The words of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) judgment in the Nicaragua decision are particularly relevant:
Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 defines certain rules to be applied in the armed
conflicts of a non-international character. There is no doubt that,
in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules also
constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate
rules which, in the Court's opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949
called elementary considerations of humanity.9
The fact that common Article 3 does not contain grave breach
provisions is irrelevant, as the Tribunal is not the agent of a state
exercising jurisdiction on the basis of the universality principle, but is
rather an international tribunal exercising statutory jurisdiction on
behalf of the world community. Further, common Article 3 has been
adopted by the successor states to the former Yugoslavia. It applied
throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia before the conflicts
began by virtue of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

7. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453rd mtg., Annex, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
8. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993).
9. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4, 114 (June 27) (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9)).
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ratification of the Conventions and continues to apply, as the successor
states also have acceded to the Conventions.
B. Additional Protocol I
Although it has not yet done so, it is reasonable to expect that
the prosecution will eventually seek indictments charging individuals
with violations of Additional Protocol I under Article 3 of the
Tribunal Statute." It is unfortunate that the grave breach provisions
of Additional Protocol I were not specifically referred to in Article 3
of the Tribunal Statute because most of Protocol I does reflect existing
customary international law and both the SFRY and the various
successor states have accepted the obligations of both Additional
Protocols." One of the drafters of the Tribunal Statute offered this
justification for the omission: "[Protocol I], notwithstanding the
customary law nature of most of its provisions, was, as a whole, not
yet qualified as indubitably part of customary law."' 2 This argument
however, is unpersuasive. The specific violations listed in Article 3 of
the Tribunal Statute are derived from the rules annexed to Hague
Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
from the 1945 London Agreement on War Criminals which provided
the basis for the Nuremberg Tribunal.13 Much of the language used
in these two documents and repeated in the Tribunal Statute is archaic
and of debatable utility. For example, Article 3(c) of the Tribunal
Statute which restates Article 25 of the Hague Rules, prohibits
"attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings .
".'..,The current U.S. Army
Manual on The Law of Land Warfare, interprets the Article 25
provision as follows:

10. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed conflicts, opened for signatureDec. 12,1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
11. The SFRY, to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a successor state, ratified the
Additional Protocols on June 11, 1979; Croatia acceded on October 8, 1991, Slovenia on June
25, 1991, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on March 6, 1992.
12. Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 5, at 364.
13. Hague Convention (IM) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex
(Regulations), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations];
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the prosecution and punishment
of the major war criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8,1945, Annex, 59 Stat. 1544,82 U.N.T.S.
280.
14. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 3(c).
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b. Interpretation. An undefended place, within the meaning of
Article 25, HR, is any inhabited place near or in a zone where
opposing armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation

by an adverse party without resistance. In order to be considered
as undefended, the following conditions should be fulfilled:
(1) Armed forces and all other combatants, as well as mobile
weapons and mobile military equipment, must have been
evacuated, or otherwise nieutralized;
(2) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations
or establishments;
(3) no acts of warfare shall be committed by the authorities
or by the population; and,
(4) no activities in support of military operations shall be
undertaken.
The presence, in the place, of medical units, wounded and sick, and
police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining law and
order does not change the character of such an undefended place. 5
As is obvious, very few places will be undefended within the meaning
of this provision. Use of outdated language in the Tribunal Statute
narrows the scope of prohibited activities. Indeed, in modern
humanitarian law, the concept of the military objective as the focus of
military operations provides greater protection to the civilian
population than the concept of the undefended place which applies in
only a few marginal situations.
Fortunately, Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute explicitly indicates
that it does not contain a closed list of violations of the laws or
customs of war. It is, therefore, possible to argue that the grave
breach provisions of Protocol I also constitute violations of the laws
or customs of war, either because the concept "laws or customs of
war" includes all of the humanitarian law treaties applicable in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia, including the Protocols, or because
specific provisions in the Protocols simply state existing customary law.
When the statute was adopted, France, the United States and the
United Kingdom all made statements in the Security Council
indicating that Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute included the Additional Protocols. 6 It may be expected that the prosecution would be
particularly interested in charges concerning grave breaches of

15. FM27-10, US Army Manual on The Law of Land Warfare,
16. U.N. Doe. S/PV.3217, supra note 8, at 11, 15, 19.

39.
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Protocol I listed in Article 85(3)(a) making the civilian population or
individual civilians the object of attack, and Article 85(3)(b) launching
an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects. 17 The prosecution may also be interested in charges related
to Article 54, which prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare.18
In some instances, it will be necessary to establish that customary
law has indeed evolved beyond its position after World War II. For
example, in 1948, a U.S. military tribunal in the German High
Command Trial made the following rather chilling finding:
Leningrad was encircled and besieged. Its defenders and the
civilian population were in great straits and it was feared the
population would undertake to flee through the German lines.
Orders were issued to use artillery to "prevent any such attempt at
the greatest possible distance from our own lines by opening fire as
early as possible, so that the infantry, if possible, is spared shooting
on civilians." We find this was known to and approved by von
Leeb. Was it an unlawful order?
A belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege to a place controlled by the enemy and endeavor by a process of isolation to
cause its surrender. The propriety of attempting to reduce it by
starvation is not questioned. Hence the cutting off every source of
sustenance from without is deemed legitimate. It is said that if the
commander of a besieged place expels the non-combatants, in order
to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions,
it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as
to hasten the surrender.
We might wish the law were otherwise, but we must administer it
it. Consequently, we hold no criminality attaches on this
as we find
19
charge.

17. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 85(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 42, 16 1.L.M. at 1428.
18. Id. art. 54, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27-28,16 I.L.M. at 1414. There is relatively rich literature
concerning the customary law status of Protocol I provisions. See, eg., Antonio Cassesse, The
Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary
InternationalLaw, 3 UCLA PAc. BAsIN L. J. 108 (1984); Christopher Greenwood, Customary
Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in HUMANrrARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
CHALLENGES AHEAD 93 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991); The Sixth Annual
American Red Cross-WashingtonCollege of Law Conference on InternationalHumanitarianLaw:
A Workshop on Customary InternationalLaw and the 1977 ProtocolsAdditional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 415 (1987).
19. United Nations War Crimes Commission, 12 LAw REPORTS OF TRiALS OF WAR
CRiMINALS 84 (1949) (citations omitted).
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It is not unreasonable to hope that, with the evolution of both
humanitarian law and human rights law since the end of World War
II, customary law on this particular point is now somewhat more
humane.
III. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
The Tribunal is not functioning in an environment similar to that
of the international military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo.
Unlike in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia continues. There is no conquering army to ensure that the
accused, witnesses, and all relevant documents are brought before the
Tribunal. Although there is a continuing conflict, it is, however,
reasonable to assume that the prosecution will take all practicable
measures to develop cases against the leaders ultimately responsible
for the terrible crimes committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, even if those leaders are still in power. The doctrine of
command responsibility will constitute an important part of legal
argument concerning the responsibility of the leadership. For the
purposes of this discussion, command responsibility is defined as the
responsibility of military, political, or bureaucratic superiors for the
acts of subordinates, and the concept includes both acts of commission
and omission. The doctrine of command responsibility is normally
viewed in the literature as essentially applicable to military commanders and as primarily concerned with responsibility for failure to act.2°
Colloquially, and among non-specialist lawyers, however, command
responsibility is regarded as a wider concept encompassing, for
example, the criminal liability assigned to major German leaders by
the tribunal at Nuremberg.2
A. Article 7
Consideration of the doctrine of command responsibility as it will
be argued before the International Tribunal must begin with Article
20. Lieutenant Commander Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a CaseStudy
of the CriminalResponsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and
Sabra, 107 MIL L. REV. 71 (1985); Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibilityfor War
Crimes, 62 MIL L. REV. 1 (1973).
21. It is possible that a new term of art such as superior responsibility should be developed.
In the absence of such a development, the term command responsibility will be used here on the
understanding that it is being given the wider, colloquial meaning. The term military command
responsibility will be used to describe the more restricted approach applicable to military

commanders.
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7 of the Tribunal Statute. Article 7 states that:
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in planning, preparation or execution
of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall
be individually responsible for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment
if the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires.'
The Report of the Secretary-General which accompanied the draft
Statute addressed the issue of command responsibility as follows:
A person in a position of superior authority should, therefore, be
held individually responsible for giving the unlawful order to
commit a crime under the present statute. But he should also be
held responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter the
unlawful behaviour of his subordinates. This imputed responsibility
or criminal negligence is engaged if the person in superior authority
knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to
commit or had committed crimes and yet failed to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or repress the commission
of such crimes or to punish those who had committed them.'
Although Article 7(3) is infelicitously worded, it provides a basis for
liability independent of Article 7(1). The superior who is found liable
under Article 7(3) is not liable for the international legal equivalent
of domestic military offenses such as dereliction of duty or negligent
performance of a military duty. If subordinates commit offenses such
as the grave breach of willful killing as referred to in Article 2 of the

22. Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 7.
23. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution
808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 56, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
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Statute, then a superior found liable as a result of Article 7(3) is also
guilty of the grave breach of willful killing. Further, a superior who
is held liable under Article 7(3) is a party to the main offense and is
liable for the commission of the applicable offense under Articles 2
through 5 of the Statute.
Article 7(3) uses a number of undefined expressions: "superior",
"subordinate", "knew or had reason to know", and "necessary and
reasonable measures". In order to understand these expressions, it is
necessary to understand both the customary law doctrine of command
responsibility and recent developments in treaty based law.
B. Command Responsibility Doctrine in the Aftermath of World
War II
The liability of political and other leaders was set forth as follows
in the Nuremberg Charter:
Art. 6: Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes [Art. 6(b) deals specifically with
war crimes and Art. 6(c) deals with crimes against humanity] are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
such plan.
Art. 7: The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of
State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not
be considered
2 4 as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.
Neither the Nuremberg Charter nor the Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals
addressed the responsibility of military commanders or other leaders
for a failure to act, probably because the degree of participation by
leaders in the offenses for which they were convicted made consideration of this issue unnecessary.
The roots of the customary law doctrine of military command
responsibility can be found in Hague Convention IV of 1907 and in
decisions of certain war crimes tribunals following World War II. In
the Hague Convention IV, one begins to see the early development
of the military command doctrine. The Convention 1) imposes an

24. THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLIcr A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 826 (D. Schindler & J. Toman eds., 2d. ed. 1981).
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obligation to issue law of land warfare instructions to the armed
forces;' 2) makes belligerent states responsible for all acts committed
by their armed forces;26 3) defines lawful combatants to include
members of the armies and also members of militia and volunteer
corps which meet certain conditions including being commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates and conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war;27 and 4) assigns
a high degree of responsibility to the commander of forces occupying
an area, in particular, an obligation to insure, as far as possible, public
order and safety.'
In general, the leading Japanese cases dealing with the doctrine
3
29
of military command responsibility such as Yamashita and Toyoda, 1
addressed incidents in which it was clear that offenses had been
committed but there was no direct evidence that the accused ordered
their commission. In the leading German cases, however, such as the
High Command case 3' and the Hostages case,32 it was usually clear that
offenses had been committed and that orders had been given at the
highest level. Consequently, the decisions in the German cases
revolve around the degree of responsibility to be assigned to commanders for implementing these orders.
The approach taken by tribunals in the post-World War II cases
differed depending on whether the accused commander was responsible for units deployed in combat as an operational or tactical
commander, or was responsible for an occupied area. A higher degree
of responsibility was assigned to occupation commanders. Although
the post-World War II tribunals were quite willing to hold military
commanders responsible in appropriate circumstances, generally they

25. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 2290, 1 Bevans 631, 639.

26. Id. art. 3, 36 Stat. at 2290, 1 Bevans at 640.
27. Hague Regulations, supranote 13, art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2295-96, 1 Bevans at 643-44.
28. Id. art 42-56, 36 Stat. at 2306-08, 1 Bevans at 651-53.
29. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Yamashita Trial,4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS

OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1949). General Yamashita was tried for atrocities committed by troops
under his command in the Philippines in the closing days of the war.
30. Parks, supra note 20, at 69-73. Admiral Toyoda was Commander in Chief of the
Japanese Combined Fleet, Combined Naval Forces and Naval Escort Command and Chief of the
Naval General staff. He was aquitted in one of the last major war crime trials.
31. United Nations War Crimes Commission, The German High Command Trial, 12 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34 (1949).

Fourteen high ranking officers of the

German army were tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
32. United Nations War Crimes Commission, The Hostages Trial, 8 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34 (1949).
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appear to have been reluctant to hold the commander's staff officers
liable because such officers rarely had executive authority. Perhaps
in part because of this reluctance, many of the witnesses testifying in
trials involving military commanders were members of the
commanders' staffs. Further, much of the documentary evidence
appears to have been captured records originally in the custody of
such staffs. For obvious reasons, prosecution cases before the
Tribunal will rarely, if ever, be in a position to make extensive use of
captured documents or captured staff officers.
The Yamashita case is probably the best known military command
responsibility case. It is thought to stand for the proposition that a
military commander is liable for the acts of his troops on the basis of
strict liability. Major William H. Parks, however, has criticized this
viewpoint:
The value of the study of the Yamashita trial lies not in its often
misstated facts nor in the legal doctrine of strict liability it purportedly espoused (but did not), but in the legal conclusions it actually
reached. Yamashita recognized the existence of an affirmative duty
on the part of a commander to take such measures as are within his
power and appropriate in the circumstances to wage war within the
limitations of the laws of war, in particular exercising control over
his subordinates; it established that the commander who disregards
this duty has committed a violation of the law of war; and it
affirmed the summum jus of subjecting an offending commander to
trial by a properly constituted tribunal of a state other than his own.
In the latter it became the foundation for all subsequent trials
arising from World War H. In the former its value lies primarily in
the general rather than the specific sense - while recognising the
duty of the commander and the violation of the law of war for
failure to exercise that duty, the duty was all the more absolute in
Yamashita because of General Yamashita's additional responsibilities as military governor of the Philippines. As military governor,
all trust, care, and confidence of the population were reposed in
him. This was in addition to his duties and responsibilities as a
military commander...33
In the trial of Admiral Toyoda, which resulted in an acquittal, the
tribunal summarized its view of the essential elements of a military
commander's responsibility as follows:
1. That offenses, commonly recognized as atrocities, were commit33. Parks, supra note 20, at 37-38.
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ted by troops of his command;
2. The ordering of such atrocities. In the absence of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of the issuance of orders then the essential
elements of command responsibility are:
1. As before, that atrocities were actually committed;
2. Notice of the commission thereof. This notice may be
either:
a. Actual, as in the case of an accused who sees their
commission or who is informed thereof shortly thereafter;
or

b. Constructive. That is, the commission of such a great
number of offenses within his command that a reasonable
man could come to no other conclusion than that the

accused must have known of the offenses or of the
existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for
their commission.
3. Power of command. That is, the accused must be proved to
have had actual authority over the offenders to issue orders to them
not to commit illegal acts, and to punish offenders.
4. Failure to take such appropriate measures as are within his
power to control the troops under his command and to prevent acts
which are violations of the laws of war.
5. Failure to punish offenders? 4
This summary of the essential elements of the doctrine of military
command responsibility constitutes, with one addition, a usable
statement of customary law as it existed around 1950. The addition
relates to notice of the offense. The Toyoda statement indicates that
actual or constructive notice of the commission of the offense must be
established. As a result of an analysis of other relevant cases, Parks
has concluded that if it is not possible to establish that the accused
ordered the commission of the offense, a military commander may
nevertheless be held liable if either actual or constructive notice is
established. Liability can also be established if the accused should
have known of the commission of the offense but has displayed such
serious personal dereliction as to constitute willful and wanton
disregard of the possible consequences. The existence of the "should
have known" test is clearly established in the case law. The content
34. Parks, supranote 20, at 72 (providing the relevant text from the official transcript of the
record of trial in U.S. v. Soemu Toyoda).
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of the test is justified on the basis that is inappropriate to hold
individuals criminally liable for offenses such as grave breaches on the
basis of lesser standards such as simple or gross negligence.35
Although it is practicable to state the customary law doctrine of
military command responsibility as it existed about 1950 in terms
which are generally acceptable, it is more difficult to establish the
elements of a more generalized doctrine of command responsibility
applicable to political and bureaucratic superiors as well as to military
superiors. One partial explanation for this difficulty is that while
existing international law, historical tradition, and military reality
impose substantial direct responsibility on military commanders to
control their troops, political leaders tend to be viewed as distanced
from military activity and insulated from personal liability. Another
partial explanation is that although the Nuremberg Charter explicitly
indicated that officials and political leaders would not be freed from
responsibility or punishment, attention was focused on incidents in
which non-military persons were active participants. As a result, while
it has become accepted that political and bureaucratic superiors can
be held responsible for acts of subordinates directly ordered, the
extent of criminal liability for acts of subordinates not ordered remains
unexplored. The only post-World War II trial which appears to have
considered the responsibility of political and bureaucratic leaders for
failure to act is the Tokyo Trial. In that case, the Tokyo Tribunal
imposed direct international legal responsibilities on political and
bureaucratic leaders as well as military leaders:
The duty to prisoners is not a meaningless obligation cast upon
a political abstraction. It is a specific duty to be performed in the
first case by those persons who constitute the government. In the
multitude of duties and tasks involved in modem government there
is of necessity an elaborate system of subdivision and delegation of
duties. In the case of the duty of governments to prisoners held by
them in time of war those persons who constitute the government
have the principal and continuing responsibility for their prisoners,
even though they delegate the duties of maintenance and protection
to others.
In general the responsibility for prisoners held by Japan may
be stated to have rested upon:
(1) Members of the government;
35. Parks, supra note 20, at 95-101.
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(2) Military or naval officers in command of formations having
prisoners in their possession;
(3) Officials in those departments which were concerned with
the well-being of prisoners;
(4) Officials, whether civilian, military, or naval, having direct
and immediate control of prisoners.
It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility rests to
secure proper treatment of prisoners and to prevent their ill
treatment by establishing and securing the continuous and efficient
working of a system appropriate for these purposes. Such persons
fail in this duty and become responsible for ill treatment of
prisoners if:
(1) They fail to establish such a system.
(2) If having established such a system, they fail to secure its
Nevertheless, such
continued and efficient working. ...
persons are not responsible if a proper system and its continuous efficient functioning be provided for and conventional war
crimes be committed unless:
(1) They had knowledge that such crimes were being committed, and having such knowledge they failed to take such steps
as were within their power to prevent the commission of such
crimes in the future, or
(2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge.36
Because the Tokyo decision stands alone, its precedential value is
ambiguous. It is unclear, on the basis of the decision, whether one
should conclude that political and bureaucratic leaders have exactly
the same responsibilities as do military leaders for the acts of their
subordinates. One reason why the command responsibility doctrine
may differ for military commanders and others is that military
commanders do exercise command. They have control over subordinates in a rigid hierarchical system with disciplinary powers and the
authority to order subordinates. The scope of this military authority
includes the power to order subordinates to risk their own lives. Most
bureaucratic leaders do not wield the same type of life and death

authority.
Despite the problem of extrapolating an analogous doctrine of
command responsibility for civilian leaders, the Tokyo decision can be
used as a guide for establishing that civilian leaders can be held
36. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS, 1946-

1948, at 48, 443-45 (1948).
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culpable for certain acts of subordinates. The Tokyo decision provides
support for the following propositions: (1) once the veil of statehood
is pierced, international law may impose obligations on political and
bureaucratic leaders in the same way that it imposes obligations on
military leaders; (2) political and bureaucratic leaders may be held
responsible for the acts of subordinates when they have ordered the
commission of these acts; (3) political and bureaucratic leaders may be
held responsible for the acts of subordinates when the leaders have a
relationship with subordinates similar to those of a military commander and they fail to act to prevent or punish; and (4) political and
bureaucratic leaders may be held responsible for the acts of subordinates when the leaders have a duty established either directly by
international law or indirectly by domestic law or practice to ensure
that their subordinates comply with the law and the leaders fail to
fulfill that duty.
C. Post World War II Developments in the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility
There have been no war crimes trials involving the doctrine of
command responsibility since the post World War II trials. In the
aftermath of the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam conflict, there
was considerable discussion of the concept of command responsibility
and its application to senior U.S. military commanders. Disciplinary
action was taken against a few senior officers and Captain Medina was
tried for a violation of U.S. municipal law under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice for the acts of his subordinate, Lieutenant Calley.
Neither the Medina case, which resulted in an acquittal, nor the
disciplinary action resulted in a significant development of the
doctrine.
The first treaty to explicitly address the doctrine of command
responsibility is the Additionar Protocol I of 1977:
Article 86 - Failure to act

1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all
other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result
from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from
penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew,
or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in
the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going
to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible
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measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Article 87- Duty of commanders
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed
forces under their command and other persons under their control,
to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to
competent authorities breaches of the Convention and of this
Protocol.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting
Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate
with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members
of the armed forces under their command are aware of their
obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol.
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall
require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other
persons under his control are going to commit or have committed
a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such
steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions
or this Protocol and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or
penal action against violators thereof37
These articles should be considered as essentially reflecting current
customary law. Although the English language version of 86(2) uses
the words "information which should have enabled them to conclude,"
the French version "des informations leur permettant de conclure"
means "information enabling them to conclude." As both languages
are official, the French version governs as it has the meaning which
reconciles the divergent texts, having regard to the object and purpose
of the treaty.
Article 86 imposes obligations on High Contracting Parties and
on "superiors," while Article 87 imposes duties on "military commanders". Despite this difference, the two separate commentaries on
Protocol I, by the ICRC 8 and Bothe, Partsch and Soil 9 discuss Article
86 in essentially military terms. The approach taken is that nonmilitary persons may be superiors within the meaning of Article 86,
but, if so, they should be exercising powers over subordinates which
are substantially similar to those of military commanders. The ICRC

37. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 86-87, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 42-43, 16 I.L.M. at 1428-29.
38. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA

CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1005-16 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC
COMMENTARY].
39. MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 523-29

(1982).
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Commentary indicates three conditions which must be fulffiled if a
superior is to be held responsible for an omission relating to an
offense committed or about to be committed by a subordinate:
a) the superior concerned must be the superior of the subordinate
b) he knew, or had information which should have enabled him to
conclude that a breach was being committed or was going to be
committed;
c) he did not take the measures within his power to prevent it.40
The ICRC Commentary discusses "superior" in what is, at a minimum,
quasi-military terms:
a) The qualification of superior

This is not a purely theoretical concept covering any superior
in a line of command, but we are concerned only with the superior
who has a personal responsibility with regard to the perpetrator of
the acts concerned because the latter, being his subordinate, is
under his control. The direct link which must exist between the
superior and the subordinate clearly follows from the duty to act
laid down in paragraph 1. Furthermore, only that superior is
normally in the position of having information enabling him to
conclude in the circumstances at the time that the subordinate has
committed or is going to commit a breach. However, it should not
be concluded from this that this provision only concerns the
commander under whose direct orders the subordinate is placed.
The role of commanders as such is dealt with in Article 87 (Duty of
commanders). The concept of the superior is broader and should
be seen in terms of a hierarchy encompassing the concept of
control.41
Although there have not been post World War II trials developing the command responsibility doctrine, there have been events
sparking further debate on the application of the doctrine. In
September 1982, Lebanese Phalangist militia forces trained, paid,
equipped, and, to a degree, under the control of Israel, were permitted
by Israel to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps near Beirut.
While there they massacred several hundred Palestinian refugees.
Following the massacre, the Israelis established the Kahan Commission to assess the responsibility of various Israeli commanders and

40. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 1012.

41. Id at 1013 (footnotes omitted).
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political figures for the massacre. Although the Commission's
treatment of command responsibility was based more on a moral
analysis rather than legal doctrine, the Commission did indicate that
certain persons were responsible on the basis of what is referred to as
"indirect command responsibility." The term "indirect command
responsibility" was used because the Phalange militia was not normally
under direct Israeli command.42 A different analysis might have
concluded that Israel did have sufficient control of the Phalangist
forces to be regarded as responsible on the basis of command
responsibility per se. No trials were held although disciplinary
measures were taken against some Israeli officers.
At the very least, the Kahan Commission adopted a legalistic
framework for assigning responsibility, although the expression
"indirect responsibility" is perhaps inaccurate:
If it indeed becomes clear that those who decided on the entry of
the Phalangists into the camps should have foreseen - from the
information at their disposal and from things which were common
knowledge - that there was danger of a massacre, and no steps were
taken which might have prevented this danger or at least greatly
reduced the possibility that deeds of this type might be done, then
those who made the decisions and those who implemented them are
indirectly responsible for what ultimately occurred, even if they did
not intend this to happen and merely disregarded the anticipated
danger. A similar indirect responsibility also falls on those who
knew of the decision; it was their duty, by virtue of their position
and their office, to warn of the danger, and they did not fulfill this
duty. It is also not possible to absolve of such indirect responsibility
those persons who, when they received the first reports of what was
happening in the camps, did not rush to prevent the continuation of
the Phalangists' actions and did not do everything in their power to
stop them.
The Commission assigned differing degrees of responsibility to those
who made or implemented the decision, those who occupied certain
positions and knew of the decision, and those who occupied certain
other positions and received reports about what was happening in the
camps. The report analyzed the decision making process related to
the decision to allow Phalange troops into the camps in some detail,
and most of its conclusions about responsibility are based on the
42. Final Report of The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in
Beirut 1983, 22 I.LM. 473 (1983).
43. Id. at 496.
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specific facts of the incident and on the facts of Israeli political life.
It asserted that political leaders have specific duties in times of armed
conflicts that cannot be evaded even if they are not involved in the
military decision making process. Further, some senior politicians may
be integrally involved in making and implementing military decisions
or may set broad military policy decisions and delegate responsibility
for decisions of lesser magnitude to military commanders.
The Commission rejected the argument that the political
leadership possessed no knowledge that the camps were being entered
and concluded that certain political leaders, once informed of the
entry into the camps, failed to fulfill duties to inquire about the
circumstances imposed by the known history of Phalangist activity.
The Commission also concluded that Phalangist excesses must have or
should have been foreseen on the basis of direct and circumstantial
evidence presented to the political leaders. The Commission's
comments on the responsibility of the Minister of Defense are
particularly telling:
As a politician responsible for Israel's security affairs, and as
a Minister who took an active part in directing the political and
military moves in the war in Lebanon, it was the duty of the
Defense Minister to take into account all the reasonable considerations for and against having the Phalangists enter the camps, and
not to disregard entirely the serious consideration mitigating [sic]
against such an action, namely that the Phalangists were liable to
commit atrocities and it was necessary to forestall this possibility as
a humanitarian obligation and also to prevent the political damage
it would entail.... [T]he Minister of Defense made a grave mistake
when he ignored the danger of the acts of revenge and bloodshed
by the Phalangists against the population in the refugee camps.
...Regarding [his] responsibility, it is sufficient to assert that
he issued no order to the I.D.E to adopt suitable measures.
Similarly, in his meetings with the Phalangist commanders, [he]
made no attempt to point out to them the gravity of the danger that
their men would commit acts of slaughter....
Had it become clear to the Defense Minister that no real
supervision could be exercised over the Phalangist force that
entered the camps with the I.D.F.'s assent, his duty would have
been to prevent their entry. The usefulness of the Phalangists' entry
into the camps was wholly disproportionate to the damage their
entry could cause if it were uncontrolled....
It might perhaps be inferred from [the Phalangists'] military
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organization that the soldiers would heed the orders of their commanders and not break discipline; but at the very least, care should
have been taken that the commanders were imbued with an
awareness that no excesses were to be committed and that they give
their men unequivocal orders to this effect. The routine warnings
that I.D.F. commanders issued to the Phalangists, which were the
same kind as were routinely issued to the I.D.F. troops, could not
have had any concrete effect.
... [R]esponsibility ,is to be imputed to the Minister of
Defense for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and
bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the refugee
camps, and having failed to take this danger into account when he
decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps. In addition,
responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for not
ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the
danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists' entry into the
camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with
which the Defense.Minister was charged."

One other document which should be taken into account is the
International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. The latest iteration of this document
buttresses the customary law position by addressing the issue of
superior responsibility as follows:
The fact that a crime against the peace and security of mankind was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superiors of
criminal responsibility if they knew or had information enabling
them to conclude, in the circumstances at the time, that the
subordinate was committing or was going to commit such a crime
and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to
prevent or repress the crime.45

IV. CONCLUSION
The customary international law doctrine of command responsibility as it is reflected in the Tribunal Statute is applicable to military
commanders, paramilitary commanders, political leaders, and other
leaders who exercise a high degree of control over subordinates. The
concept of command responsibility imposes personal criminal responsibility on a superior for international crimes committed by persons

44. Id. at 502-03.
45. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. at 24, U.N. Doe. AICN.4/460, (1994).
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under his or her command or control. The superior may be held
responsible for the acts of subordinates: (1) if the superior planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
commission of a crime, or (2) if the superior failed to prevent or
punish the perpetration of crimes by persons under his or her
command or control.
A superior may be held liable for the commission of an offense
as a result of a failure to act if the following elements are established:
1. An offense was committed;
2. Either
2.1: the persons committing the offense were under the
command of the accused, that is, the accused had the authority
to issue orders to them not to commit illegal acts and the
authority to see that offenders were punished; or
2.2: the persons committing the offense were under the control
of the accused, that is, the accused had a duty to ensure that
they complied with the law, the ability to prevent them from
committing illegal acts and the ability to see that the offenders
were punished;
3. Either
3.1: the accused had notice of commission of the offense.
The notice may be either:
3.1.1: Actual, as in the case of an accused who sees their
commission or who is informed thereof shortly thereafter; or
3.1.2: Constructive. That is, the commission of such a great
number of offenses within his command that a reasonable man
could come to no other conclusion than that the accused must
have known of the offenses or of the existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for their commission; or
3.2: the accused should have known of the commission of the
offense but has displayed guch serious personal dereliction as
to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible
consequences;
4. The accused has failed to take such appropriate measures as are
within his power to direct the persons under his command or his
control and to prevent the commission of offenses; and
5. The accused has failed to take appropriate measures to punish
the perpetrators.
In order to assess the potential culpability of individual superiors
it is necessary to collect evidence on the following points, among
others:
1) the commission of the offense;
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2) the nature of the superior - subordinate relationship between the
accused and the perpetrators (military, paramilitary, other), (direct
superior in chain of command, superior in rank only), (executive
authority, staff officer);
3) the means available to the accused to exercise control over the
perpetrators (authority to issue binding orders, authority to take or
recommend disciplinary measures, types of disciplinary measures
available);
4) the state of knowledge of the accused before, while, and after
offenses were committed;
5) the routine or extraordinary systems available to provide
information to accused, effectiveness of systems and relevant
information provided;
6) the notice of alleged offenses provided to accused by external
sources -NGO's, U.N., press, other;
7) the measures taken by accused to prevent commission of offense
or to punish those responsible; and
8) the extent of accused's participation in the commission of the
offense. Did he or she plan, instigate, order, commit or otherwise
aid and abet in the planning, preparation or execution of the
offense?
It is clear that, under the existing international law doctrine of
command responsibility, as reflected in the Tribunal Statute, political,
paramilitary and bureaucratic superiors may be held liable for a failure
to control their subordinates as well as for acts they have themselves
committed. After the World War II cases involving the doctrine of
military command responsibility, it was possible to develop a relatively
precise word picture of the doctrine as it applied to military operations.4 6 It is not unreasonable to hope that proceedings before the
Tribunal will add flesh to the skeleton of the doctrine of command
responsibility as it applies to political and other leaders.

46. See generally Parks, supra note 20.

